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 A Transnational Actor on a Dramatic 
Stage – Sir Ivor Jennings and the 
Manipulation of Westminster Style 
Democracy: The Case of Pakistan 
H. Kumarasingham*
Across first Asia and then Africa new states rose from colonial rule 
in the post-war era that sought to build New Westminster constitutions. 
The Westminster model was the transnational trend after 1945 in 
constitution-making for much of the world emerging from colonial rule and 
was promoted by the Colonial Office, Indigenous leaders and constitutional 
advisers such as the ubiquitous Sir Ivor Jennings. However, this flexible 
and ambiguous regime type caused many political and constitutional crises 
that questioned the wisdom of applying Westminster to these states. Jennings 
worked across Africa and Asia including in Ceylon, Nepal, Malaya, 
Singapore, the Maldives, Sudan, Ethiopia, South Africa, and the 
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. It is Pakistan, however, that sticks 
out as Jennings’s most controversial role where he effectively, legally and 
politically, contentiously defended a “constitutional coup” by the Governor-
General against the Constituent Assembly in 1954. The case also serves to 
demonstrate how the manipulation and divisive interpretations of 
Westminster conventions and institutions in the first decade of Pakistan led 
to the breakdown of democracy and laid conspicuous precedents for 
dictatorship and military rule, which have explanatory value in 
understanding the country’s prevalent fragility in embedding accountability 
and democracy. 
“[W]e shall have to go far back in history and to trace the origin and 
subsequent development of the British Empire itself.”1 So stated the opinion of the 
Chief Justice of Pakistan, Muhammad Munir, when searching for the legal 
justification of the controversial dissolution of the Constituent Assembly on 
October 24, 1954 by the Governor-General to forestall the adoption a new 
constitution that would have curbed his powers. In a context where the country was 
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1.  Federation of Pakistan v. Moulvi T. Khan, (1955) 240 PLD (SC) (Pak.). 
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attempting to craft a republic based on Islamic principles in South Asia, the case 
and crisis it passed judgment on relied on templates from the settler states where 
few Muslims resided. Decisions and actions of English monarchs stretching back 
to the seventeenth century were employed. It was Halsbury’s, not Hammurabi’s 
laws that guided the proceedings.2 It remains the most dramatic court case in 
Pakistani history following one of the most controversial constitutional crises in the 
common law world. Sir Ivor Jennings believed the case “dealt with fundamental 
principles of constitutional law of interest throughout the Commonwealth.”3
Jennings would know. Not only was he the world’s foremost expert on the 
constitutions of the Commonwealth at the time, he also played a direct role in 
Pakistan as adviser, advocate and author of critical legal, political, and academic 
writings on the crisis. Many Pakistani scholars angrily denounce the crisis as the real 
beginning of that country’s descent into dictatorship and its ruling elites’ enduring 
attraction to martial rule. 
Jennings, as the Governor-General’s adviser, colluded to ex post facto justify 
a constitutional coup d’état that crushed democratic saplings, ridiculed the rule of 
law, and exposed the dangers of adopting the Westminster model and the 
conventions and prerogatives that came with it.4 As a constitution-maker of 
transnational influence and scope, the role of Jennings in Pakistan provides an 
insight into how selective precedents and interpretations from across the British 
Empire and Commonwealth were used to justify what appeared unjustifiable. In 
turn, the “Pakistan Formula,” as Jennings confidentially called his contentious fix 
there, was drawn upon for other states around the world that he advised—primarily, 
as was the case in Pakistan, to frustrate, if not suspend, the will of parliament to the 
advantage of unelected elites.5 The actions of Jennings in Pakistan, using Halliday 
and Shaffer’s Transnational Legal Order definition, are that of an actor who, with 
the wilful cooperation of bureaucratic and judicial officers, authoritatively forged 
the understanding and practice of transnational common law for employment in 
Pakistan. The consequences of this enhanced a socio-legal environment that dented 
the rule of law and re-orientated it towards more illiberal “behavioural” ends and 
impacting on legal orders in the country ever since.6
Sir Ivor Jennings was one of the twentieth century’s most influential 
constitutional scholars and became, from the 1940s till his death in 1965, one of its 
most established “constitution-makers.”7 Before the term was employed, Jennings 
2.  Multiple editions of Halsbury were used in these cases before the Pakistani courts. 
3.  IVOR JENNINGS, CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS IN PAKISTAN vii (1957). 
4.  H. Kumarasingham, Exporting Executive Accountability? Westminster Legacies of Executive Power,
66(3) PARL. AFF. 579 (2013). 
5.  For example in Nepal. 
6.  See, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS 8-11 (Terence C. Halliday & Gregory Shaffer, eds., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 2015). 
7.  See generally H. KUMARASINGHAM, CONSTITUTION-MAKER: SELECTED WRITINGS OF SIR
IVOR JENNINGS (2015); H. KUMARASINGHAM, CONSTITUTION-MAKING IN ASIA –
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was undoubtedly transnational in his scholarship and had near omnipresence across 
the British world. The vast British domains in Asia proved his most important and 
significant arena for constitution-making.8 Starting from his arrival in Colombo in 
March 1941, to head what would become the University of Ceylon, he soon became 
an unofficial adviser to D.S. Senanayake, the preeminent political leader in the island 
destined to be its first prime minster. Jennings, with Senanayake and the local 
panjandrum, O.E. Goonetilleke, formed the “nucleus of a Reforms Ministry.” Here 
the new Vice-Chancellor acted as the constitutional adviser “on tap” giving 
expertise that unquestionably improved Ceylon’s (and especially Senanayake’s) 
case.9 This famous trio relied on each other and, with near exclusivity, conducted 
and formulated the Ceylon side of the negotiations with the British. Jennings, just 
thirty-eight when he arrived, played a major role in the articulation of Ceylon’s 
independence demands and relished it. Jennings’s role went well beyond the 
academic and ventured into the political. It was a role he craved, but also one that 
elicited jealousy and deep suspicion as to how much this Englishman was 
influencing high politics, especially when not only the citizenry, but even the leading 
local politicians were kept out of deciding Ceylon’s future. Jennings had, in fact, no 
formal role. As he admitted “Officially I did not exist.”10 Official or not, locals noted 
his presence and sway.11 Prominent Ceylonese journalist Mervyn de Silva 
sardonically penned a portrait of Jennings in the press, which some Pakistanis could 
well have recognized. 
As Vice-Chancellor Jennings went from success to success in this country, 
from Commission to Commission, and finally to the exalted position of 
one of the architects of Ceylon’s independence, and thence to a 
knighthood, the patronising air with which he looked upon the campus 
was extended to cover the whole nation. And when, with Ceylon as a base, 
his influence broadened out to cover neighbouring countries Pakistan, 
Malaya, the Maldives which consulted him on constitutional matters, he 
found it possible to patronise a whole continent. It is a fact that at least 
two of these countries have been riddled with constitutional crises and 
catastrophes since Sir Ivor left their shores. But to match Sir Ivor’s own 
manifest modesty if for no other reason, we refuse to credit our ex-Vice-
Chancellor with responsibility for these historic events!12
The “immature democracies”13 of Asia, as Jennings termed them, nonetheless 
sought his counsel and he became, from Punjab to Penang, an Asian transnational 
DECOLONISATION AND STATE-BUILDING IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE 173-94
(2016) (for an introduction on Jennings’ life and this aspect of his career). 
8.  See generally H. KUMARASINGHAM, CONSTITUTION-MAKING IN ASIA – DECOLONISATION 
AND STATE-BUILDING IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE 1-35 (2016). 
9.  H. KUMARASINGHAM, THE ROAD TO TEMPLE TREES: SIR IVOR JENNINGS AND THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF CEYLON: SELECTED WRITINGS 10 (2015). 
10.  Id. at 16. 
11.  Id. at xxvi-xxvii 
12.  KUMARASINGHAM, supra note 9, at xxvi-xxvii. 
13.  IVOR JENNINGS, THE APPROACH TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 32 (1956). 
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constitution-maker and adviser. Jennings was well regarded and employed for three 
main reasons. First, he had the reputation as the preeminent expert on 
Commonwealth constitutions with several of his major (and best) publications 
completed before the Second World War. Second, he had substantial experience in 
Asia as Ceylon’s Vice-Chancellor 1941-55 and university business across the region.
He was also known to some of the leaders and leading lawyers of the region in an 
era that was flush with Oxbridge men.  Finally, he was very hardworking and had 
form in getting things done quickly, however thorny the situation. His ability and 
versatility to draw upon the constitutional wealth of British and Imperial precedents 
was legendary. This pleased the elites who dominated the upper echelons of Asian 
states and who employed Jennings to give a solution with the imprimatur of a British 
academic who was not in the pocket of Her Majesty’s Government. 
The constitutional form the Westminster model afforded enabled multifarious 
versions and styles to sprout globally. Westminster consciously avoided rigid 
constitutional and institutional forms and instead nurtured convention and context 
to provide the constitutional order.14 While not the determining political factor in 
the crises that will be detailed below in Pakistan, Westminster-style government was 
nonetheless a regime-type, with its deliberate ambiguity and tacit assumptions, that 
greatly assisted the actions and objectives of the Pakistani elite in retarding 
democracy and for Ivor Jennings to creatively give legal cover for them. 
Transnational legal expertise was critically deployed for narrow national political 
ends. Jennings was able to draw on common law and Commonwealth political 
history to service the needs of the Pakistani establishment, despite the unlikely and 
unsuitable transferability of much of his advice for the major political crises that 
confronted the young state. 
The Indian Independence Act of 1947, which crafted the Pakistani state, 
facilitated a Constituent Assembly to sit and create a constitution for the Dominion. 
As Alan Gledhill put it, while “India succeeded to the capital, the instrumentalities, 
and the accommodation of the central government, Pakistan had to improvise.”15
An example of this was when M.A. Jinnah, who was the unquestionable founder of 
Pakistan, became, without precedent, both Governor-General and President of the 
Assembly. Pakistani politicians and the population accepted and often revered 
Jinnah as the Quaid-i-Azam, the great leader, and did not question this 
concentration of power and influence. In contrast to every other part of the 
Commonwealth at that time, and with no other twentieth century example, the 
Crown in Pakistan and its representative were endowed with critical political power. 
This power was supplemented by the ambiguous conventions surrounding the 
office, giving ample ground to interpret awesome authority unheard of in any other 
Westminster style state. Pakistan was no dictatorship in 1947, however, and it was 
believed that its exceptional creation allowed for exceptional actions from its creator 
14.  Kumarasingham, supra note 4. 
15.  ALAN GLEDHILL, PAKISTAN – THE DEVELOPMENT OF ITS LAWS AND CONSTITUTION
65 (1957). 
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to cement the foundations and interests of the state. This context allowed 
extraordinary political power in the hands of the Governor-General. Jinnah chaired 
and directed Cabinet, instructed provincial governors, and gave orders to the civil 
and military services. This was not meant to carry on after Jinnah’s death in 
September 1948—just over a year after independence.16  Nonetheless precedents 
and personalities existed for the dramas of 1954. 
Constitution-making in Pakistan was a very lackluster affair compared to 
constitution-making in India.17 The Assembly hardly concerned itself with its 
constitution-making task. In the first fourteen of its sixteen sessions, it only 
managed to clock up fifty-seven days between 1947 and 1953.18 Instead, much of 
the real political activity occurred beyond the legislature at the desks of the 
bureaucracy, canteens of the officers’ mess and the Governor-General’s residence. 
Political parties were largely incidental. The Muslim League, once the great minority 
party of undivided India, began to crack under the pressures and fissions of the new 
Pakistan’s ethnic and linguistic diversity and struggle with the factionalism and 
impatience that political leaders had for party democracy. As Andrew Harding has 
argued, the two-party system was meant to be part of the Westminster export 
model, but was rarely found anywhere, especially in Asia.19 Into the breach were old 
institutions of the Raj now largely manned by local elites. Viceregalism was in vogue, 
evoking the “oriental despotism” of India’s viceroys, and colonial era practices not 
only continued, but were often accentuated. Even viceroys during the Colonial era 
were restrained by the India Office and Parliament in London. Evidence of 
accentuation and the non-party executive constellation that ruled the country can 
be seen with the former Indian Civil Servant Ghulam Mohammed, Governor-
General since 1951, openly sacking the Muslim League party Prime Minister, 
Khwaja Nazimuddin, due to policy and personal differences in April 1953 without 
advice and without reference to the legislature where the Prime Minister claimed a 
majority. Nazimuddin, himself a former Governor-General, was replaced by a non-
politician, Mohammed Ali Bogra, who was then serving as Ambassador to 
Washington, and was expected to carry out the wishes of the bureaucratic-military 
axis, which he largely did. The Governor-General instructed the Law Minister to 
issue a statement to quell constitutional mutterings attaching “undue emphasis on 
certain conventions as they are known to the British constitutional practice.”20
Most, however, were very pleased with the action since the government had grown 
unpopular and had lost control of East Pakistan. The American Ambassador 
reported to Washington that the Governor-General’s action against Nazimuddin 
16.  See Ayesha Jalal, Inheriting the Raj: Jinnah and the Governor-Generalship Issue, 19 MOD. ASIAN 
STUD. 29 (1985). 
17.  See H. KUMARASINGHAM, A POLITICAL LEGACY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE 25-45 (2013). 
18.  KEITH CALLARD, PAKISTAN: A POLITICAL STUDY 80 (1957). 
19.  Andrew Harding, The Westminster Model Constitution Overseas: Transplantation, Adaptation and 
Development in Commonwealth States, 4 OXFORD U. COMMONWEALTH L. J. 160 (2004). 
20.  ALLEN MCGRATH, THE DESTRUCTION OF PAKISTAN’S DEMOCRACY 98 (Oxford Univ. 
Press 1996). 
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was “one of the most popular coups in history.”21 A coup nonetheless, and one that 
breached not the law, but convention. 
Sir Ivor Jennings noted of the dismissal that “on all British precedents, this 
action was completely unjustifiable . . . .”22 Nonetheless the Cambridge-educated 
public law scholar had been selected in July 1954 to advise the Constituent 
Assembly. His name had been discussed since the idea of Pakistan became a 
reality.23 Despite not having explicit expertise on Pakistan, he was selected. Indeed 
he confessed to the Secretary of the Ministry of Law and fellow Englishman, Sir 
Edward Snelson, after receiving a request to help advise the Governor-General, that 
he was not “sufficiently familiar with the law of Pakistan to advise what legal form 
proceedings should take.”24 Jennings prided himself, however, on his adaptability: 
“[c]learly one cannot sit in the Constituent Assembly Building in Murree or Karachi 
and draft a Constitution for the Gold Coast. There are, however, common elements 
which make it possible to at least define the problem.”25 The new Prime Minister 
expressed to the population in a broadcast on April 1, 1954, that Pakistan was 
“being advised by Sir Ivor Jennings, one the greatest constitutional authorities in 
the world.”26 Providing advice on constitutional matters, as he had already done 
around the world, could have been a rather normal role for Jennings. However, in 
Pakistan it was not his role as constitutional adviser to the Assembly which draws 
the focus of this article, but instead his highly secretive and crafty role in advising 
the Governor-General and bureaucracy on the dissolution of the constituent 
assembly and the subsequent political and legal justifications of a power most 
scholars and lawyers believed the Crown no longer possessed and did not exist in 
Pakistan.27 This role, therefore, compelled Jennings to find defenses, precedents, 
and prevarications that only someone of his immense transnational and comparative 
knowledge of constitutional practices across the world could bring to the rescue of 
what even he thought unlawful. 
21.  Id. at 97. 
22.  See KUMARASINGHAM, supra note 8, at 136. 
23.  His name for example was mentioned for the role as early as 4 July 1947. See 3 QUID-I-
AZAM MOHAMMAD ALI JINNAH, Z. H. ZAIDI, JINNAH PAPERS: ON THE THRESHOLD OF PAKISTAN
85 (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan 1996) (correspondence from H. L. Ismay to Liaquat Ali Khan, 
4 July 1947, F. 2/175). 
24.  See Sir Ivor Jennings Papers, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London, 
Jennings to Snelson, at ICS 125/BXV/4 (10 Nov. 1954). 
25.  IVOR JENNINGS, THE APPROACH TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 11 (1956). 
26.  S.S. PIRZADA, DISSOLUTION OF CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY OF PAKISTAN AND THE 
LEGAL BATTLES OF MOULVI TAMIZUDDIN KHAN 42 (Asia L. House 1995). Sir Kenneth Roberts-
Wray, Legal Adviser to the Colonial Office and later author of COMMONWEALTH AND COLONIAL
LAW (1966) for one did not have a high opinion of Jennings and considered his draft constitution for 
Ceylon “quite useless” – an opinion he repeated in 1956 when Jennings was about to go to Malaya as 
part of the Reid Commission. See KUMARASINGHAM, supra note 8, at 9; A.W. BRIAN SIMPSON, HUMAN 
RIGHTS AND THE END OF EMPIRE: BRITAIN AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION
859 (Oxford Univ. Press 2001); See also KUMARASINGHAM, supra note 9. 
27.  See MCGRATH, supra note 20. 
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There is . . . no power in GOI [Government of India] Act to dissolve the 
Federal Legislature. It was in GOI Act s. 19, but was removed in 1947. 
Nor is there power to dissolve CA in I.I. [India Independence] Act. In 
other words, this is a revolutionary act . . . This illustrates the general 
principle that an act of illegality compels other acts of illegality.28
However, this did not perturb Jennings, who afterwards would even admire 
his own legal finesse: “[t]here is no provision in the Government of India Act for 
the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly. The action taken was therefore both 
unconstitutional and illegal. This raised certain problems, which seem to have been 
solved at least temporarily with considerable success.”29 As Paula Newberg argues, 
these years where Jennings operated showed a period that “took refuge in the 
presumed impartiality of inherited constitutional instruments without recognizing 
their deficiencies and structural partialities” with disastrous consequences for future 
constitution-making.30 Jennings was no creature of the Pakistani elite; he knew what 
he was doing and the local elite knew whom they were employing. This was not a 
neo-colonial plot to destabilize a non-western state, though there were political 
gains for Pakistan’s Anglo-Saxon allies, but instead an example of internal political 
machinations given extra fuel from external actors like Jennings. Arguably the crises 
and its immediate outcome legitimized both Jennings and the Pakistani 
establishment that directed him. The Queen, on the advice of her Pakistani 
ministers, even felt emboldened to make Jennings a Knight Commander of the 
Most Excellent Order of the British Empire at the end of his mission in the country, 
and he would go on to collect further academic and national honors with his advice 
sought from Nigeria to New Zealand.31 Pakistan’s rulers no doubt congratulated 
themselves that their coup against parliamentary democracy was not only defended 
by Jennings but lauded in the international press. In London the oldest journal of 
international affairs, The Round Table, congratulated the governor-general from 
“stopping the rot” by dissolving the “irresponsible” Constituent Assembly and 
concluded that the “common man and the country have suffered long; and if we 
now have people at the helm of affairs who we know are clear in their visions and 
have honesty of purpose we are inclined to wish them god-speed and forget 
everything else.”32
Looking at the crisis and the context surrounding the dissolution, it is evident 
how much the Westminster system was being used and interpreted in different ways 
to suit the Pakistani elites’ purposes. The Westminster model became, as Woodrow 
Wilson predicted, the “world’s fashion,” especially after 1945.33 However, as A.F. 
28.  See supra note 24, Revolution in Pakistan, at ICS 125/B/15/6 (25 Oct. 1954). 
29.  Kumarasingham, supra note 4, at 132. 
30.  PAULA R. NEWBERG, JUDGING THE STATE: COURTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS 
IN PAKISTAN 65 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2002). 
31.  KUMARASINGHAM, supra note 9, at 3. 
32.  The Crisis in Pakistan, 44 ROUND TABLE 50 (1954). 
33.  Pippa Norris, The Twilight of Westminster? Electoral Reform and its Consequences, 49 POL. STUD.,
no. 4, at 877 (2000); H. Kumarasingham, Eastminster – Decolonisation and State-Building in British Asia, in 
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Madden reminds us, countless British colonial reports, statesmen, and officials 
counselled strongly against the suitability of Westminster as transnational regime 
type.34 Most in Whitehall till the twentieth century shared the view of the 
redoubtable senior nineteenth century Colonial Office mandarin, James Stephen, 
that to create “miniature” British constitutions across the world, especially for 
places with substantial non-European populations, was “the grossest of 
absurdities.”35 The 1930 Simon Report into Indian constitutional reform perceived 
the experiment in introducing Westminster to the East as dangerous. “The 
introduction into an oriental country, with a long history of autocracy, of methods 
of self-government evolved during centuries of experiments by a Western nation 
for its own conditions and people was a momentous and even hazardous 
enterprise.”36
Nonetheless, for much of the twentieth century, the Westminster model 
travelled far and wide, not as an imposed form of constitution-making, but instead 
as one that both British and indigenous politicians desired in order to achieve 
ambitions of geopolitical connection, a belief that this system was the best and most 
understood, and local intentions to wrest away the awesome power of the colonial 
state into their waiting hands.37 As De Smith argues, another characteristic which 
critically made this all possible and enabled the system’s export to far corners of the 
globe of improbable suitability was that “uniformity is neither sought nor 
achieved.”38 Conventions were critical therefore, but this still meant that for those 
across the world that chose Westminster style government the “dichotomy of law 
and convention was preserved, and most of the really important conventions were 
left to the interpolator.”39
Ivor Jennings was, and remains, one of the most critical sources on British and 
Commonwealth conventions and in some cases was not just advising or read on the 
subject, but became its “interpolator” himself, critically so in the case of Pakistan. 
Famously he opined that in the Westminster system conventions were “the flesh 
which clothes the dry bones of the law.”40 Transnational constitution-making in 
such a style of government was far from a rigid and mechanical transferal. Instead, 
conventions for one constitution were anathema for others—despite having 
comparable institutions and origins. The conventions that surrounded the Crown 
CONSTITUTION-MAKING IN ASIA: DECOLONISATION AND STATE-BUILDING IN THE AFTERMATH 
OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE 9, 10-11 (H. Kumarasingham ed., 2016). 
34.  A.F. Madden, ‘Not for Export’: The Westminster Model of Government and British Colonial Practice,
8 J. Imperial & Commonwealth Hist. 19 (1979). 
35.  Id.
36.  INDIAN STATUTORY COMMISSION, REPORT OF THE INDIAN STATUTORY COMMISSION 
VOLUME II—RECOMMENDATIONS CMD. 3569, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF OUR PROPOSALS 4 
(1930). 
37.  S.A. De Smith, Westminster’s Export Models: The Legal Framework of Responsible Government, J.
COMMONWEALTH POL. STUD. 4 (1961). 
38.  Id.
39.  Id.
40.  IVOR JENNINGS, THE LAW AND THE CONSTITUTION 81 (5th ed. 1959). 
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were a bone of contention in Pakistan throughout the 1947-1956 period when it 
was a Dominion with a Governor-General representing the monarch in 
Buckingham Palace. The Westminster model often experienced “dyarchical 
malfunctions” in Asia.41 The critical position of Head of State in Asia was rarely 
ceremonial and apolitical as Westminster convention dictates; instead, the 
Eastminsters of Asia took on a major “deviation” from the settler cases.42 Asian 
heads of state routinely interfered in politics, wielded significant executive power, 
frustrated policy, and had a very different definition of the Westminster maxim of 
“responsible advice.”43
This central element of Westminster government faced problematic 
transnational translation; it forms the crux of the crisis and where Ivor Jennings, 
constitution-maker par excellence, played a formidable role in bringing down the 
constitutional order of Pakistan. As W.J.M. Mackenzie observed on the task of 
constitution-making, “[a] lawyer’s constitution is dead until it strikes roots in the 
political soil.”44 Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton argue in their wide-ranging survey on 
the content of authoritarian constitutions that not only are there “few systematic 
differences across the formal constitutions of democracies and dictatorships,” but 
instead the “most important determinants of constitutional form are the era and the 
region in which the constitution was written and the set of institutions chosen for 
the first constitution in the country’s history.”45 A difficulty of transnationalism in 
a legal framework is, as Jothie Rajah argues, that it risks homogenising and can 
perpetuate “notions of nation as the unproblematic vehicle of sovereign equality.”46
This is especially problematic when there are nations and states subsequent to the 
“Westphalian moment,” namely the post-colonial variety.47 Pakistan was about to 
cultivate its democratic constitution for one more resembling dictatorship thanks to 
the ambiguity of the Westminster model and the ingenuity of Ivor Jennings. 
Since July 1954, Jennings had been advising the Constituent Assembly to 
devise a new constitution. Since the tabling of Basic Principles in 1949 by then-
Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan, Pakistan had the aim of becoming a republic with 
Islamic character.48 As mentioned above, the Assembly, as a constitution-making 
body, was very desultory. The activity increased in its last two sessions when the 
Assembly was finally framing a new constitution. The total days spent as a 
41.  Harding, supra note 19, at 159. 
42.  See Kumarasingham, supra note 33, at 16-19. 
43.  Id.
44.  W.J.M. MACKENZIE, Constitution Making, in EXPLORATIONS IN GOVERNMENT –
COLLECTED PAPERS 1951-1968, 252, 260 (Palgrave Macmillan 1975). 
45.  ZACHARY ELKINS ET AL., The Content of Authoritarian Constitutions, in CONSTITUTIONS IN 
AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES 141, 162 (Tom Ginsburg & Alberto Simpser eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 
2013). 
46.  Jothie Rajah, ‘Rule of Law’ as Transnational Legal Order, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS
340, 346-47 (Terence C. Halliday & Gregory Shaffer eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2015). 
47.  Id.
48.  See G.W. CHOUDHURY, CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN PAKISTAN 35-58 (2d ed., 
Longman 1970). 
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constitution-making body before its dissolution in October 1954 during these last 
two sessions was more than the previous fourteen sessions put together—though 
still just fifty-nine days.49 Though there were key American constitutional ideas 
concerning executive accountability, Jennings observed a preference for English 
constitutional practices, many Pakistani legislators resembled the Barons at Merton 
in 1236 pronouncing “nolumus leges Angliae mutare”—”we do not want to change the 
laws of England.”50 Critically, though, the new constitution explicitly aimed to curb 
the powers of the head of state and make legally conspicuous the need for the head 
of state to follow advice.51 The dismissal of Nazimuddin the previous year was 
clearly on the minds of those in the Assembly. The influential paper Dawn
approvingly carried the headline “Parliament Made Supreme Body.”52 In essence 
much of what the Assembly approved on September 21, 1954 was the codifying of 
conventions, which would close off opportunities for the Governor-General to act 
except on advice of his ministers and the assertion of the supremacy of parliament. 
The draft constitution was submitted to Jennings, who made “extensive but minor 
changes” and was sent to the Government Printers on October 15, 1954 with the 
aim that the country would have a new constitution based on a more stable form of 
parliamentary democracy.53 As Geoffrey Marshall argued of Pakistan, “the lawful 
seat of sovereignty was in dispute for more than seven years after the Independence 
Act of 1947.”54 The Assembly was attempting to clear the constitutional confusion. 
Meanwhile Ghulam Muhammad was not impressed and unlikely to accept a 
recalibration of his powers that would compel him to act as a traditional 
Westminster head of state. Mohammed, Karl Newman contends, “was not only 
active, ambitious and somewhat given to intrigue but he was also the product of the 
Indian Civil Service with all its traditions of vigorous executive action, especially in 
times of crisis or failures of political leadership,” and therefore in the crisis that he 
saw in Pakistan felt legitimately emboldened and “left the path of constitutional 
government.”55 Pakistan’s military and bureaucracy, including the Governor-
General, were keen to cement financial and defense support from the Americans, 
who had been wary of the country’s political instability. While in Washington in 
September 1953 and afterwards, Ghulam Mohammed, with Ayub Khan and the 
backing of Iskander Mirza, both future military rulers, assured American officials in 
that critical Cold War climate that Pakistan would be its ally and that it would not 
become a “fanatical theocracy,” which apparently the constituent assembly 
promoted when recommending the Islamic influence over the constitution. Instead 
they would withstand political pressures of “religious zealots” and offered the 
49.  See KEITH CALLARD, PAKISTAN – A POLITICAL STUDY 80 (George Allen & Unwin 1958). 
50.  JENNINGS, supra note 13, at 12. 
51.  G.W. Choudhury, The Constitution of Pakistan, 29 PAC. AFF. 243, 248 (1956). 
52.  MCGRATH, supra note 20, at 124. 
53.  Id.
54.  GEOFFREY MARSHALL, PARLIAMENTARY SOVEREIGNTY AND THE COMMONWEALTH
133 (Clarendon Press 1957). 
55.  Karl J. Newman, Pakistan’s Preventative Autocracy and Its Causes, 32 PAC. AFF. 18, 24-25 (1959).
2017] A Transnational Actor on a Dramatic Stage 43 
prospect of a “constitutional dictatorship,” which envisioned the Governor-
General at the helm with the support of the military and all provinces under 
Governor’s rule, except East Bengal, which the military would directly control—in 
addition, the Constituent Assembly would be dissolved.56 This indeed was largely 
what happened on October 24, 1954. The passing in the Assembly of the draft 
constitution alerted Ghulam Muhammad to action. The Governor-General 
“scorned the idea of any parliamentary government in Pakistan.”57 As Choudhury 
argues, “[t]hough he pretended to favour the American executive system, his real 
model was the vice-regal pattern of the British period.”58 With the support of the 
military and civil service, and after brow beating the Prime Minister in the early 
hours, who was dramatically summoned from Washington, Ghulam Muhammad 
acted defiantly and issued a proclamation on October 24, 1954, which extinguished 
hopes for Pakistani parliamentary democracy. The defeated acquiescence of 
Muhammad Ali Bogra as Prime Minister enabled his puppet-master, Ghulam 
Mohammed, to produce someone to take political responsibility for actions the 
Prime Minister had no part of and to appease the radical reformation of the cabinet 
he supposedly headed.59
The Governor-General having considered the political crisis with which 
the country is faced, has with deep regret come to the conclusion that the 
constitutional machinery has broken down. He therefore has decided to 
declare a state of emergency throughout Pakistan. The Constituent 
Assembly as at present constituted has lost confidence of the people and 
can no longer function. The ultimate authority vests in the people who will 
decide all issues including constitutional issues through their 
representatives who are to be elected; fresh elections will be held as early 
as possible.60
The Prime Minister, who had only days earlier praised the Assembly for 
completing its principal constitution-making task, now felt compelled to announce 
to the world: “Constitution-making by the present Constituent Assembly has 
56.  See AYESHA JALAL, THE STATE OF MARTIAL RULE: THE ORIGINS OF PAKISTAN’S
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DEFENCE 185-87 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1990). 
57.  Id.
58.  CHOUDHURY, supra note 48, at 32. 
59.  See supra note 24, at ICS 125/BXV/6 (10 Nov. 1954) (Jennings recorded in his diary ‘When 
PM Ali arrived in London on 22/10, he was met by Ispaham (H.C.) and Iskander Mirza. They had 
arranged for him to leave immediately by RAF Hastings for Cyprus, where a second Hastings was 
waiting. For some reason unknown he refused the services of the RAF and, after a delay of four hours, 
chartered a BOAC plane. He arrived in Karachi on the night of the 23/11. Two government Hare cars 
were waiting, + with them the C. in C. Ali was invited to get into one of the cars, which he did, sitting 
between the two generals. When Mrs. Ali tried to follow, she was politely requested to get into the other 
car. Ali was whisked off to GH and Mrs. Ali to the PM’s house.  Ali was asked to wait downstairs while 
the generals talked to GG. He was then sent for + told what GG wanted. He refused to agree. He was 
again asked to wait while a further discussion took place. This went on until 2.30 a.m., when he finally 
agreed. The impression I got, though I did not exactly say so, was that Ali was given a choice between 
agreement and arrest. Next morning the Secretaries were sent for + the Proclamations issued. The new 
Ministers were sworn in that night (24/10). From then on, GG and PM have worked together.’) 
60.  Federation of Pakistan v. Moulvi T. Khan, (1955) 240 PLD (SC) (Pak.). 
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resulted in developments which threaten to imperil our national unity. It has 
provoked personal, sectional and provincial rivalries and suspicions. These have to 
be curbed, and Pakistan’s interests must be put above everything else. This is what 
the Governor-General’s action envisages.”61
It was reported that Muhammad Ali Bogra’s acceptance of Ghulam 
Muhammad’s invitation to re-form the government meant he was in agreement with 
the dramatic actions taken by the Governor-General in his absence abroad.62 The 
Times correspondent speculated a day later that: 
Pakistan would not be true to herself if not every lawyer was busily re-
reading constitutional law to define the legality of the action taken by the 
Governor-General last Sunday. It is not unlikely that the legal argument 
will continue for months, but a recently arrived observer, bemused by 
seemingly contradictory acts, sections and clauses, can quickly come to one 
conclusion: whatever the Opposition lawyers may have to say – and it 
seems it will be unending – Karachi at least has accepted Mr. Ghulam 
Muhammad’s intervention calmly and perhaps with relief.63
Time magazine called Ghulam Muhammad the “Reluctant Dictator.”64 The 
President of the Constituent Assembly, Moulvi Tamizuddin Khan, disagreed with 
the “reluctance” and challenged the dissolution in the Courts.65 Into this context 
Ivor Jennings was summoned back. The constitution-maker was to be the 
constitution-breaker.
Though the crisis is well known to Pakistani historians and legal scholars (less 
so outside of Pakistan), the role of Jennings has never been substantially addressed 
or exposed through his papers. The preeminent and most well-known historical and 
political account of Pakistan’s road to military rule, Ayesha Jalal’s State of Martial 
Law, for example, has no mention of Jennings’s role.66 Similarly, the best legal study 
of Pakistan’s courts, Paula R. Newberg’s Judging the State: Courts and Constitutional 
Politics in Pakistan, while astutely getting to the heart of the legal-political quagmire 
of the dissolution, finds no place for Jennings’s substantial influence on the crisis.67
Jennings did publish his own account of the events in Pakistan in Constitutional
Problems in Pakistan, but this emphasized the constitutional soundness of dissolution 
and minimized his own effect, giving little attention to critical or alternative views 
of the dissolution.68 Perhaps for this reason the book is uncharacteristically sober, 
and without the usual flourish and mordant words that can be found in most of his 
work, with the majority of it reproducing memoranda and judgements. Allen 
McGrath’s Destruction of Pakistan’s Democracy has been one of the few works that have 
61.  Emergency Rule for Pakistan, THE TIMES, Oct. 25, 1954, at 6. 
62.  Id.
63.  Karachi Scene Unchanged, THE TIMES, Oct. 27, 1954, at 6. 
64.  Reluctant Dictator, TIME MAGAZINE, Apr. 11 1955, at 36. 
65.  Pakistan v. Khan, supra note 60. 
66.  See JALAL, supra note 56, at 185-87. 
67.  See NEWBERG, supra note 30. 
68.  See JENNINGS, supra note 3.
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given an important place to Jennings in the 1954 crisis as a “scholar-turned-
advocate” who provided “constitutional ideas which were used to legitimize 
autocracy in Pakistan.”69 This article utilises material from the Jennings archive that 
has never been used before, and in so doing gives crucial insight into one of the 
most destructive forms of post-war constitutional advise, which flowed from 
Jennings’s scholarly experience and transnational authority. 
After the dissolution, the Governor-General reformed his Cabinet and invited 
the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, General Ayub Khan, to join as Defense 
Minister.70 The open inclusion of a serving officer set a grievous precedent and 
opened the door to what Tayyab Mahmud terms praetorianism that would usher in 
military rule over the country, becoming its dominant governance style.71 Dawn
captured that time a few years later when military rule was soon unveiled: 
There have indeed been times – such as that October night in 1954 – when 
with a General to the right of him and a General to the left of him, a half-
mad Governor-General imposed upon a captured Prime Minister the 
dissolution of the Constituent Assembly and the virtual setting up of a 
semi-dictatorial Executive.72
Just days after the dissolution, Sir Edward Snelson, Secretary to the Ministry 
of Law, sent a telegram on November 1, 1954 to Jennings stating, for cover, that he 
was to be on “holiday” in Ceylon, but, nonetheless, wanted to see Jennings, where 
he was Vice-Chancellor, urgently on November 3, 1954.73 Jennings sent a car for 
Snelson to bring him straight to Peradeniya and from there they saw Ceylon’s 
Governor-General, Sir Oliver Goonetilleke (no stranger to vice-regal and political 
intrigue), on the fifth for almost two hours, evidently to discuss the political and 
constitutional machinations in Pakistan. Snelson and Jennings then flew to Karachi 
that same day.74 Jennings had already heard rumors that the Governor-General 
would dissolve the Assembly while still in Pakistan. Jennings confided to his diary 
on the day of the dissolution: 
Once you start on illegality you can never stop. This is not 1688: in England 
everybody tried to keep as close to the law as possible and there was no 
party conflict. Even so the non-juror movement was quite substantial. 
Before I left Karachi I pointed out . . . how fine was the line between law 
and anarchy. There is, of course, an alternative to anarchy, dictatorship. At 
the moment that seems to be where Pakistan is heading . . . Further 
consideration brings out another point. CA was to have met on the 27th, 
and I think PM Ali was to have returned that day. The Draft Constn. was 
69.  See MCGRATH, supra note 20. 
70.  Newman, supra note 55, at 26.
71.  Tayyab Mahmud, Praetorianism and Common Law in Post-Colonial Settings: Judicial Responses to 
Constitutional Breakdowns in Pakistan, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 1225, 1234 (1993). 
72.  KHALID B. SAYEED, POLITICS IN PAKISTAN: THE NATURE AND DIRECTION OF CHANGE
35 (Praeger 1980). 
73.  See supra note 24, Note, at ICS 125, BXV/6 (10 Nov. 1954). 
74.  Id.
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to have been reported on the same day. It seems, therefore, that GG 
recalled Ali in order to get the coup d’etat effected before the CA members 
returned from their Provinces. They will not even be provided with their 
travelling expenses. The question is whether Nazimuddin and Nishtar will 
acquiesce or whether they will organise an opposition. If they do, they will 
probably be arrested under GOI rules, or the rules succeeding them. Note 
that Nehru is in China. In his absence, nobody is likely to order the Indian 
Army into East Bengal. What a chance he has missed! West Pakistan could 
then become a small unitary State.75
Jennings added that he was worried he would not get paid for the consultative 
work he did for the Assembly, though Snelson assured him he would!76 Following 
the intensive discussions in Ceylon, Jennings was happy to help but wanted formal 
instructions. After even more discussions about fees, housing, allowances and 
currency preferences, Jennings was asked informally and then formally to answer 
the following questions at the request of the Governor-General and Law Ministry: 
1. Did the Governor-General act constitutionally in (a) dissolving the 
Constituent Assembly and (b) inviting the Prime Minister to ‘re-form’ 
the Cabinet 
2. Was the reconstituting of the Ministry by the Governor-General and 
Prime Minister unconstitutional? 
3. On what grounds could a challenge be brought into the Courts as to 
the legality or constitutionality of (a) the dissolution (b) the re-forming 
of the Ministry and what would be the issues? 
4. How should any challenge be met? 
5. If Courts accept the ‘challenge’ from Tazimuddin what should be done 
to meet the resulting situation?77
The challenge came swiftly. Just days after Jennings arrived back in Pakistan, 
a petition was delivered to the Sindh High Court. As Ginsburg, Elkins, and Blount 
argue, the use of international actors in constitutional design can have critical effect. 
One major potential effect being where external participation “may lead drafters to 
adopt suboptimal or inappropriate provisions designed for the needs of others.”78
Extrapolating this for Pakistan, Jennings had been brought in to solve Ghulam 
Mohammed’s dilemma of how to constitutionally and politically justify his actions 
in a context of ambiguous constitutional status. Jennings may have succeeded in 
creatively fulfilling his “brief” to the governor-general, but it is no large step to see 
this more importantly as having “suboptimal” effects for Pakistani democracy. For 
one Pakistani academic, the action utilized relied on powers available in all 
Westminster democracies; it was only evoked to “nourish” democracy. 
75.  See supra note 24, Revolution in Pakistan, at ICS 125/B/XV/6 (25 Oct. 1954). 
76.  See id.
77.  See id.
78.  Tom Ginsburg et al., Does the Process of Constitution-Making Matter?, 5 ANN. REV. L. SOC. SCI.
201, 214 (2009).
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All this should cause no surprise or alarm to students of constitutional 
history. The plant of parliamentary government is delicate and sensitive. It 
needs care and nourishment . . . The Governor-General had to step in and 
act as the guardian of the Constitution. The reserve powers that he used 
are available to executives in nearly all democratic constitutions.79
The situation was full of farce and risk (as recounted over forty years later by 
S.S. Pirzada, one of the Assembly President’s counsel—who unlike Jennings took 
the case gratis). 
[Tamizuddin] left his house through the back door disguised as a burqa-
clad woman and in a rickshaw reached the Court through the side gate. 
The main gates of the Court were watched by Intelligence personnel. I 
drove to the Court in a diplomat’s car which had dark glasses and was able 
to enter without being noticed. My junior Homi Nicholwala scaled a side 
wall and received minor injuries.80
The petition to the Sindh High Court was made on the night of November 7, 
1954, and the affidavit was signed by Manzar-i-Alam as the identifying advocate.81
When Manzar-i-Alam duly turned up in his own car at the main gates of the Court 
to present the petition, he was taken into protective custody and only when the 
Sindh Chief Justice, Sir George Constantine, ordered the police to release him or 
face contempt was Manzar-i-Alam allowed to join the others.82 An alleged 
unsuccessful attempt was also made on the life of Pirzada on November 11, 1954, 
by the government security officers.83
As the government’s adviser, Jennings, in the opening session, was questioned 
by the Court due to his constitutional experience. However, the Assembly’s legal 
team then, understandably, wanted to cross-examine him, which convinced 
Jennings to refrain from speaking in court and instead allow his arguments to 
pervade through instructions.84 D.N. Pritt Q.C., with his remarkable political and 
legal career, was called urgently to represent Tamizuddin. Waiving most of his fee 
and keeping with the dark comedy of the situation, Pritt pretended to be a surgeon 
in all cables to Pakistan “who might be required for a difficult operation in Karachi.” 
Like the opposing side, Pritt met in clandestine circumstances in Ceylon to discuss 
the case, flew to Pakistan, and then took an omnibus to avoid attention.85 Pritt 
argued “that a somewhat remarkable feature of the proclamation was that it did not 
give any legal authority to support it: it was just an announcement of intentions. It 
made no attempt to rely on prerogatives or statutory provisions’ and did not even 
79.  Khalid B. Sayeed, The Governor-General of Pakistan, 8 PAK. HORIZON, no. 2, 330, 338-39 
(1955). 
80.  PIRZADA, supra note 26, at 54-55. 
81.  Id.
82.  Id.
83.  Id.
84.  MCGRATH, supra note 20, at 168. 
85.  D.N. PRITT, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF D.N. PRITT, PART III 48 (Lawrence & Wishart 
1966). 
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mention the word ‘dissolution.’”86 Pritt also countered the government’s reliance 
on the royal prerogative by asking “whether it was right to destroy the Constituent 
Assembly on the basis of a prerogative right which existed 250 years ago” by a 
governor-general who is not part of the constitution-making body in a way that the 
Queen is part of the U.K. legislature.87 Despite such unpropitious circumstances, 
the Sindh High Court found in favor of the Tamizuddin, holding that the Governor-
General did not have the authority to dissolve the Assembly since this was not part 
of the India Independence Act.88 The Chief Justice found: 
There is no case throughout the Commonwealth outside England where 
dissolution of a Legislature takes place except by express provision in the 
Constitution, whether granted by statute or order in council. The 
prerogative of dissolution in my opinion extends only to the parliament of 
the United Kingdom: elsewhere dissolution is dependent upon statute or 
order in council . . . It follows, therefore, that the Constituent Assembly’s 
purported dissolution is a nullity in law, and that both it and the office of 
its President are still existent . . . I would therefore issue a writ of 
mandamus restraining the respondents from preventing the petitioner 
from performing the functions of his office of President of the Constituent 
Assembly.89
The drama then moved to the federal court because there was no chance the 
Governor-General could admit wrong in this high-stakes performance. Even a 
compromise formula, which would have saved face for both sides and maintained 
the dissolution, was ruled out by Ghulam Mohammed for fear it would unravel the 
legitimacy of his past actions.90 Politics was at the fore, which demoted law to a 
position of expedience. As a study of British legal thought contends, Jennings was 
“primarily concerned with the architecture of power” over doctrine and 
procedure.91 A.W. Brian Simpson notes Jennings was “a firm believer in the right 
of states to protect themselves against subversion.”92 In Pakistan, an English don 
was behind the subversion of the constitution from above. Jennings recorded that: 
There is thus initial dictatorship. It seems very unlikely that either the 
Governor-General or the Prime Minister would wish to perpetuate this 
position: but, now that there has been departure from strict legal principles, 
there is no great practical difficulty about going further. So long as the 
Army and the police support the Governor-General, anything whatever 
may happen.93
86.  PIRZADA, supra note 26, at 106-09. 
87.  Id.
88.  See id.; see also Indian Independence Act, 1947, 10 & 11 Geo. 6, c. 30. 
89.  Id. at 126-27 (containing all Pakistan legal decisions, PLD 1955, Sind 96). 
90.  McGrath, supra note 20. 
91.  JANET MCLEAN, SEARCHING FOR THE STATE IN BRITISH LEGAL THOUGHT 234 
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2012). 
92.  A.W. BRIAN SIMPSON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE END OF EMPIRE 860 n.178 (2004). 
93.  KUMARASINGHAM, supra note 8, at 133.
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With such thinking in mind, Jennings efficiently prepared not only a new 
creative defense, but also plans to suspend the constitution and enable emergency 
rule should the federal court uphold the lower court’s ruling. Proficient as ever, 
Jennings gave four options for the Cabinet to legitimize the actions of the 
Governor-General as well as four immediate steps to make this easier (including the 
suspension of habeas corpus).94 In a very matter-of-fact way, Jennings drafted an 
order to transfer all legislative powers to the Governor-General “excluding the 
jurisdiction of the Courts. I have explained that this cannot be legally justified, but 
that it is easy enough for the Govt. to refuse to give effect to judicial decisions.”95
In this dangerous legal situation was an even more dangerous political one; few 
wanted to challenge the Governor-General as democrats wilted: 
HM [Honourable Minister] Law gave me a copy of a telephone message 
from A.G. at lunch, + after lunch HM Interior joined us in conference. 
They wanted a Proclamation assuring a dictatorship, which I drafted after 
lunch + had ready for a Cabinet at PM’s house. The Cabinet decided 
nothing but moved to GG’s house at 6 p.m., where also nothing was 
decided. HM Law and Interior were alone in their anxiety for dictatorship, 
though HM Communications spoke up for them at the GGs. PM was 
obviously disturbed at the suggestion, but had no views of his own. The 
others also lacked decision of any kind.96
Jennings, of course, was the major source of Westminster constitutional 
practice and his published works seemed to contradict his arguments in Pakistan. 
For example, Jennings noted in his Manual of Cabinet Government that the 
monarch cannot “secure a dissolution without ‘advice’” without bringing 
conspicuous damage to the Crown.97 Interestingly, in the third and final edition of 
the volume published in 1959, Jennings inserts a bare footnote that in Pakistan the 
Queen’s Representative did in fact dissolve the legislature without advice, but only 
because Pakistan “did not import British constitutional practice.”98 Indeed Jennings, 
while in Pakistan, had met the Chief Justice, Muhammad Munir, “off the record,” 
as had the Governor-General. The Chief Justice recommended “that GG must take 
over Government under ‘natural law’ powers.”99 After getting a Royal Pakistan Air 
Force flight to Lahore, Jennings rushed to Munir’s residence (Snelson “backed out” 
from this utterly improper conclave) and discussed in great detail the arguments and 
“suggested amended sections” which indicated emergency powers the “C.J. had not 
94.  See supra note 24, Note for Cabinet, at B/XV/3/1. 
95.  See supra note 24, Diary 31, at B/XV/8 (Mar. 1955). 
96.  See supra note 24, Diary 13, at B/XV/8 (Apr. 1955). 
97.  IVOR JENNINGS, CABINET GOVERNMENT 412-13 (3rd ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1959) 
(saying that Queen Victoria made “vague suggestions” about it in regard to the political dynamite that 
was Gladstone’s Irish Home Rule.  She was dissuaded from doing so by all her advisers, with even 
Gladstone’s archrival, Lord Salisbury, believing it would “injure the authority” of the sovereign). 
98.  See supra note 97, at 412 n.1. (noting that the Sovereign would be justified in refusing assent 
to a policy “which subverted the democratic basis of the Constitution.” Arguably in the 1954 it was the 
Crown, not any other institution, which was subverting the democratic principles of the Constitution). 
99.  See supra note 24, Diary 28, at B/XV/8 (Mar. 1955). 
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noticed”. Jennings was then given substantial insights into the Chief Justice’s 
thinking in justifying the dissolution.100 Returning to Karachi, “Snelson then carried 
me off to GG’s house for a Cabinet meeting . . . the GG, with applause, made a 
little speech which was obviously a speech of thanks to me.”101
Perhaps not entirely in jest due to the consequences, Jennings added “but as I 
understood not one word it might have been an order for my immediate arrest!”102
The refrain “Would Sir Ivor Jennings be good enough to draft notes and the Order 
accordingly?”103 became a common one. 
Nonetheless, in court, Munir did not give an easy ride as his collusion might 
point. The Advocate-General, Fayaz Ali, for example as seen in the exchange below, 
had clearly not read his Jennings for a master class in expedient precedents. This 
selection of exchanges in court between the Chief Justice and Advocate-General 
gives a flavor: 
AG: My first proposition is that the right of dissolving the legislative body 
in England is the prerogative right of the Crown. 
CJ: Do you mean to suggest that the King of England has got the right to 
dissolve the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan? 
CJ: Had the prerogative been exercised by any of the Dominion[s] 
independently of the Statutes? Can you give us an instance where this 
prerogative of dissolution was exercised by any one on behalf of [the] 
Dominion independently of the authority given to that functionary by the 
Act? 
AG: I must say I have not been able to find a parallel but the principle is 
there. . . . 
CJ: Can you give us an instance where this right of prerogative was 
exercised in any Dominion by His Majesty the King independently of any 
Statute? 
AG: Unfortunately, My Lords, there was no instance in which there was 
not a provision made for it. . . 
CJ: Why should that obvious thing be missing from our Constitution? 
CJ: But we are in Pakistan. Do not talk of English ideas or English 
institutions.104
Future Law Lord Kenneth Diplock Q.C., was brought in to defend the 
dissolution. Unlike the Advocate-General, Diplock was well prepared and “quoted 
authorities to ‘make it clear that the power of the Crown to dissolve and convene 
representative Assemblies was extended to overseas colonies.’”105 No stretch of 
imagination is required to discern which “authority” he was getting these 
100.  See supra note 24, Diary 28, at B/XV/8 (Mar. 1955). 
101.  See supra note 24, Diary 28, at B/XV/8 (Mar. 1955). 
102.  See supra note 24, Diary 28, at B/XV/8 (Mar. 1955). 
103.  See supra note 24, Diary 28, at B/XV/8 (Mar. 1955). 
104.  See PIRZADA, supra note 26, at 154-58. 
105.  Id. at 263. 
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Commonwealth facts from as well as his line of argument. Nothing was off limits. 
Jennings, through Diplock, successfully questioned the validity of the Constituent 
Assembly on the grounds that it had failed in its functions of representing the 
people and presenting a constitution.106 Jennings also in turn questioned the 
independence of Pakistan by arguing that the Queen’s prerogatives still functioned 
despite not being used in Britain since the seventeenth century.107 The Chief Justice 
agreed, and had stated previously that the Constituent Assembly “lived in a fool’s 
paradise” if it thought it was the sovereign body of the state.108 Instead the Court 
was convinced by Jennings’s argument that “there can never be a lacuna in the 
Constitution of an independent country under the Crown.”109 Jennings added 
mischievously that “the margin the powers of the Crown are deliciously vague, the 
draftsman’s dream of the blanket clause that covers everything he has forgotten or 
cannot foresee.”110 Into this vacuum marched the Governor-General as the sole 
“properly constituted” authority in the land.111 Salus Populi Suprema Lex was added 
in, as the Chief Justice had secretly advised, to give further argument to the 
Governor-General taking on extraordinary powers in the absence of responsible 
advice or explicit statutory provision. Jennings’s legal bravado consequently meant 
that all the laws of Assembly were invalid since they did not have the royal assent, 
which the Assembly never believed it needed since it did not see the Governor-
General as part of the Assembly. 
If this was not enough, Diplock argued that “the statement of His Majesty’s 
Government by which the Constituent Assembly was set up [sic] a particular 
manner, had no force of law nor the previous statements made by the Prime 
Minister of England about the Independence of India” and stated that the 
Constituent Assembly’s claim to be a sovereign body and “perpetual” was nonsense 
and “the very negation of all democratic institutions.”112 The very legality of 
Pakistan was thus put on trial. However, quick drafting from Jennings enabled his 
boss, the Governor-General, to re-validate the majority under emergency 
ordinance.113 Such dexterity did not disguise authoritarianism. Nonetheless, without 
shame, Jennings pronounced in his published account that “the British tradition for 
the Rule of Law has been firmly established in Pakistan. In the long run, clearly, it 
was to Pakistan’s advantage to follow the straight and narrow path of legal rectitude, 
rather than the broad and attractive highway that might, in the end, reach a 
dictatorship.”114 Pritt had many skirmishes with the Chief Justice, including later 
106.  Federation of Pakistan v. Moulvi T. Khan, (1955) 240 PLD (SC) (Pak.). 
107.  Id.
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where Munir alluded reproachfully to Pritt’s political sympathies toward the Soviet 
Union.115 Pritt sought to puncture the deception of using law to cover political acts. 
[I]t [is] difficult to import the notion of prerogatives and the common law 
in the area of a Government and no amount of Latin phrases could justify 
the introduction of these principles in this context . . . the argument of 
“salus populi” in the case of a lacuna was put forth only to give a legal force 
to a political conception.116
As Pritt argued, the fact that the Prime Minister, just nights before the 
Assembly was dissolved, felt emboldened to state that it would have a new 
constitution ready by Jinnah’s birth anniversary, December 25, 1954, was hardly to 
be stated if it was not functioning properly. Instead the Assembly was tarred as 
“broken down” by the Governor-General’s ordinance.117 This argument was also 
used by the sole dissenting Justice A.R. Cornelius.118 Fellow counsel I.I. Chundrigar 
added that the Assembly “could commit suicide but could not be murdered.”119 The 
federal court disagreed and found in favor of the Governor-General. Justice 
Cornelius dissented and, in contrast to his fellow federal justices, saw no justification 
from the Commonwealth for the dissolution or value in the “lacuna” argument in 
the constitution for the use of the “royal prerogative.”120
The situation was taken further when the Governor-General and Law 
Minister, perhaps pushing for further advantage, asked for guidance on the 
constitutional position and whether further executive, legislative, and emergency 
powers could be usurped by the Crown over the state. Starkly the Chief Justice 
explained:
[t]he situation . . . is that after experimenting for more than seven years 
with a constitution which was imposed on this country, with the consent 
of its leaders, by a statute of the Parliament of the United Kingdom, called 
the Indian Independence Act, 1947, we have come to the brink of a chasm 
with only three alternatives before us: (i) to turn back the way we came by; 
(ii) to cross the gap by a legal bridge; (iii) to hurtle into the chasm beyond 
any hope of rescue.121
Munir then proceeded to try and respect alternative (ii), but in fact followed 
alternative (iii). Drawing on the heavy transnational constitutional knowledge which 
common law judges then possessed he called upon several precedents from across 
South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, Colonial America, and the Australian states of 
Victoria and South Australia to justify the Crown power to force dissolution.122
115.  PIRZADA, supra note 26, at 278. 
116.  Id. at 272, 275. 
117.  Id. at 281. 
118.  Id. at 361. 
119.  Id. at 283. 
120.  Federation of Pakistan v. Moulvi T. Khan, (1955) 240 PLD (SC) 506-07 (Pak.). 
121.  REPORT ON THE SPECIAL REFERENCE MADE BY HIS EXCELLENCY THE GOVERNOR-
GENERAL OF PAKISTAN (1955). 
122.  Id.
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However, the most lasting legacy to Pakistan’s constitutional life was Munir’s 
evocation of the Law of Necessity. 
Having anxiously reflected over this problem I have come to the 
conclusion that the situation presented . . . is governed by rules which are 
part of the common law of all civilised States and which every written 
constitution of civilised people takes for granted. This branch of law is, in 
the words of Lord Mansfield, the law of civil or State necessity.123
The Chief Justice then treated the court to an array of English worthies for 
transnational consumption. Legal luminaries including Bracton, Broom, Darling, 
Reading, Dicey, Hood, Phillips, and Maitland were joined in company of rulers 
Cromwell, Charles II, William, Mary, and James II to impress upon Pakistan the 
essential need and legitimacy of powers used by Ghulam Muhammad—despite such 
powers being unknown in Britain itself for almost 300 years.124
It is worth quoting at length the argument of Jennings’s successor at 
Cambridge as the Downing Professor of the Laws of England, S.A. de Smith, who 
while never mentioning his near contemporary clearly has Jennings in mind when 
demeaning the position taken in Pakistan. 
What respectable legal arguments can be advanced for justifying the 
validity of conduct which appears manifestly unlawful? Ask the 
constitutional lawyer and the legal theorist. He will find the arguments. 
Into the dustbin with Entick v. Carrington. Into the law reports with Bracton, 
Grotius, Kelsen, the American civil war, salus populi suprema lex. Clubs shall 
be trumps, might right, and judges philosophers if not kings. 
. . . . 
In short, it was very important for the court not to come to a conclusion 
adverse to the Governor-General on the main issues. Fortunately it was 
possible for the court to come to a favourable conclusion, and by using 
rules of public law found in the books, albeit unfashionable books. Nor 
did the court have to justify its decision by treating the Governor-General 
as a successful revolutionary; instead, it was able to discern legal continuity 
by invoking the doctrine of necessity to bridge the gap between the law 
and the facts of political life. In 1958, as we shall see, this option was closed 
and the court was faced with undisguised revolution claiming the accolade 
of legitimacy. 
It is clear, then, that the leading Pakistani decision in 1955 was a not very 
well disguised act of political judgment. By the normal canons of 
construction, what the Governor-General had done was null and void. But 
the judges steered between Scylla and Charybdis and chose what seemed 
to them the least of evils. I must add that by accepting the principle of 
necessity as a justification for otherwise unlawful conduct they did not give 
the Executive carte blanche; for example, the principle did not invest the 
123.  Id.
124.  Id.
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Governor-General with power to change the existing constitutional 
structure. Yet state necessity, civil necessity or what you will, is the unruliest 
of all horses, which can gallop away with constitutional law into the domain 
of political expediency.125
Munir mournfully confessed on his retirement in 1960: 
The mental anguish caused to the Judges by these cases . . . [is] beyond 
description . . . no judiciary elsewhere in the world had to pass through 
what may be described as a judicial torture . . . . At moments like these 
public law is not to be found in the books; it lies elsewhere, viz, in the 
events that have happened.126
Ultimately he decided to side with the Governor-General since otherwise he 
was, “quite sure that there would have been chaos in the country.”127Anil Kalhan 
argues that the doctrine of necessity, derived from common law, when transplanted 
to places like Pakistan, can be, “used to validate extraconstitutional action, giving a 
judicial stamp of approval to . . . efforts to wrest control from democratic, legislative 
institutions.”128 Kalhan continues that colonial era emergency powers were more 
often than not crafted not to “establish legality” nor to “preserve legality,” but 
instead to assert colonial executive power.129 Pakistan (and India) “inherited these 
understandings” in their independent constitutional set up.130 The crisis of 1954, as 
Anne Twomey argues, “opened the door . . . for the ‘doctrine of necessity,’ which 
was to prove critical in the subsequent history of Pakistan being relied upon as 
recently as 2007 by General Pervez Musharraf.131 The situation further deteriorated 
after Jennings’s time in Pakistan to a parlous state where, as Siddique argues in his 
legal analysis of martial law, the Courts were going “to fantastical extremes in order 
to validate illegal takeovers, adducing support from obscure and controversial 
jurisprudential sources.”132 Newberg’s study of judicial politics records the 
damaging consequences of this dramatic period in Pakistani history. 
By giving the Governor-General wide berth and offering precedents to 
uphold executive intervention in constitutional and legislative activities, the 
immediate consequences of the Federal Court rulings were detrimental for 
Pakistan’s developing polity and particularly for legislative sovereignty. For 
125.  S.A. de Smith, Constitutional Lawyers in Revolutionary Situations, 7 W. ONT. L. REV. 93, 94, 98 
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the longer term, the court established a practice of striking unspoken 
bargains with those in power so that its rulings would be obeyed and those 
in power would not feel defied. For a higher purpose—stability, perhaps 
democracy—the illusion of judicial independence would overtake the 
reality of its partial domination by those it sought to restrain or influence. 
At a crucial time in Pakistan’s history, the judiciary molded this 
interpretation of prudence into a precedent from which it would later find 
it hard to depart.133
As Tahir Kamran argues, Jennings “came and rescued those whose exit would 
have done Pakistan a world of good.”134 A.G. Noorani, for one, excoriates Jennings 
in the strongest terms for breaches in confidentiality, impropriety, legal cherry-
picking, giving “shocking” advice, and commanding fees seven times greater than 
those paid to the Federal Chief Justice.135 Jennings’s role in the events following the 
dissolution of Pakistan’s legislature are that of “a learned lawyer’s gross 
misconduct.”136 As Pakistan’s leading legal historian concluded, the “echoes” from 
the controversies and calamities of the constitutional and political crisis that 
Jennings was directly involved in “can still be heard in current constitutional 
developments in Pakistan.”137 Ghulam Muhammad, ill and dying, was reluctantly 
pushed out of Government House not long after his “victory” in August 1955.138
The new Cabinet had I.I. Chundrigar as Law Minister—the same who had been 
defending the case of the Constituent Assembly in the federal court. Jennings 
records in his diary that the new Minister “politely sacked” him on September 8: “I 
should be glad to be out of it . . . I have done all the interesting work, + the rest will 
be . . . unpleasant . . . .”139 The last entry for his Pakistan diary contains the following 
words, “everybody must be heartily sick of Constitution-making.”140 Looking at his 
actions from a transnational legal order framework Jennings was decisively able as 
a legal-political actor to adopt Westminster legal forms and draw on the 
transnational body of common law and royal powers to selectively bring “order” to 
the “problem” of avoiding democracy in Pakistan.141
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Jennings considered “Pakistan Formula” might prove useful, however, to 
other Westminster states engaged in state-building. To this end he provided it to 
the UK’s Commonwealth Relations Office. 
Dear Sir Ivor, thank you very much. It is most kind of you to offer me a 
copy of your memorandum about the position in Pakistan and I should 
indeed be grateful if you would let me have it. It would be of the greatest 
interest to me personally, and I know that those at the top of the 
Commonwealth Relations Office in London would be equally interested in 
seeing the views of an acknowledged expert. I can assure you that we will 
all respect your confidence and see that no word about it gets back to the 
Government of Pakistan.142
Jennings’s job was over in Pakistan, but his legacy remains. Ivor Jennings’s 
role in Pakistan shows the dangers that constitution-making can have and how 
transnational practice can easily be harnessed to lend legitimacy to actions beyond 
the original meaning. The Westminster style of government and the conventions 
that add “flesh” to it were particularly malleable to such habits. He directly and 
covertly helped establish precedents and principles to justify non-democratic 
actions and therefore sowed the seeds for detrimental constitutional practices that 
have congested the soil of Pakistan ever since. 
142.  See supra note 24, Sir Cecil Syers to Jennings, at ICS 125, BXV/6 (6 Nov. 1954). 
